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An Examination Of Domestic Subsidies
And The Standard For Imposing
Countervailing Duties
KEVIN

I.

C. KENNEDY*

INTRODUCTION

Since the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,1 the
courts have had only a handful of opportunities to address the question of whether a particular domestic development program of a foreign government is a countervailable subsidy under the U.S.
countervailing duty (CVD) law. This article analyzes four of those
decisions. It argues that the Court of International Trade has in at
least one instance given the CVD law far too broad a sweep, bringing
within its prohibitory ambit development programs of foreign governments which Congress did not intend to be countervailed and which,
in the interests of international comity, are better left not countervailed. On careful inspection the decisions of the Court of International Trade in this area cannot be reconciled.
We begin with a background discussion of the countervailing
duty law.

II.

BACKGROUND

The original countervailing duty law, 2 the Tariff Act of 1890, was
*
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1. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at scattered sections of titles 5, 13, 19,
and 26, U.S.C.).
2. Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567 (1890). See deKieffer, When, Wy, and
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little more than special interest legislation for the domestic sugar industry.3 Because tariffs were set by Congress at a level judged to be
sufficient to provide the desired protection to targeted industries, foreign subsidies were viewed as attempts to breach the tariff wall erected by Congress. In essence, the offending foreign subsidies
effectively nullified the protection accorded the U.S. sugar producers.
Consequently, countervailing duties were designed to offset the exact
amount of the foreign subsidy and thereby maintain the integrity of
the tariff protection.4 While, in 1890, the CVD law was limited in
scope to the domestic sugar industry, by 1897 all imports were subject
to the CVD law.5
Prior to 1922, the CVD law only extended to subsidies given on
the exportation of merchandise, 6 not on the manufacture or production of merchandise. The Tariff Act of 19227 for the first time imposed countervailing duties not only against subsidies on the
exportation of merchandise to the United States, but also on the manufacture and production of such merchandise.8 The countervailing
duty law was not substantially amended again until 1974. 9
From 1922 to 1974 the Department of the Treasury-the agency
responsible during this period for administering the CVD law--consistently countervailed against export subsidies.10 Most of these took
How to Bring a CountervailingDuty Proceeding. A Complainant'sPerspective, 6 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & CoM. REG. 363, 364 (1981).
3. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 451 (1978); Downs v. United
States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903); ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200, 1208 (Cust.
Ct. 1979).
4. Because the amount of the tariff was assumed to be necessary to provide the desired
protection, any subsidized import was presumed to cause injury to the competing American
industry. Therefore, no injury test was required prior to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
By the same token, merchandise entering the United States duty free was deemed by Congress
not to be in competition with comparable merchandise produced by the U.S. industry. Accordingly, since U.S. producers needed no tariff protection, they likewise did not require protection through the countervailing duty law. The countervailing duty law was first applied to
non-dutiable merchandise in 1974 with passage of the Trade Act of 1974.
5. Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205 (1897).
6. Id. See ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200, 1208 (Cust. Ct. 1979)
("the first countervailing duty law of general application was enacted as section 5 of the Tariff
Act of 1897 [footnote omitted]").
7. Ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858, 935 (1922).
8. Id. at 944. Countervailing duties were also imposed on subsidies given by a "person,
partnership, cartel, or corporation," not just by governments. Id.
9. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2011 (codified in scattered sections of title 19, U.S.C.).
10. The term "export subsidy" is defined as "a subsidy conditioned on export of the
product or on export performance." Barcelo, Subsidies, CountervailingDuties and Antidump-
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the form of bounties awarded to exporters. I In 19.23 the first countervailing duty was imposed on steel products from Australia to offset
a domestic subsidy.' 2 Although there was no apparent intent to increase exports of steel products, the production subsidy was nonethe-

less offset without regard to any intent to or effect of increasing
exports. 13
The end of World War II marked a dramatic shift in U.S. international trade policy from one of protectionism-the highwater mark
of which being the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930' 4-to one of trade
liberalism. i 5 This shift toward internationalism was evidenced by the
Truman administration's strong support for the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 16 This shift in international economic
policy was best reflected in the Treasury Department's administration
of the CVD law. Administrative delay was the primary instrument to
achieve this policy, 17 since prior to 1974 no statutory deadlines existed
for disposing of countervailing duty petitions filed by adversely affected domestic industries. 18 The Treasury allowed dust to gather on
ing After the Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257, 261 (1980) [hereinafter Barcelo I]. A
"domestic subsidy" (sometimes referred to as a "production subsidy") is one "granted without
respect to output destination." Id. at 261. See also J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE
LAW OF GATT 365-99 (1969) [hereinafter Jackson I]; Low, A Definition of "Export Subsidies"
in GATT, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 375 (19,2).
11. See Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty. An Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax
Adjustments, and the Resurgence of CountervailingDuty Law, 1 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 17
(1969), where the author identifies a host of export subsidies-direct subsidy payments, excessive tax rebates, preferred income tax treatment, government price support systems, export loss
indemnification, subsidies for specific production and distribution costs, currency manipulation plans, and tax remissions-which were countervailed during the period from 1922 to
1974.
12. T.D. 39,722, 11 Treas. Dec. 307 (1923). See T.D. 40,001, 45 Treas. Dec. 129 (1924).
13. See ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. at 1211-13.
14. Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 46 Stat. 687.
15.

See

J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

396-97 (1977) [hereinafter Jackson II].
16. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Parts 5-6, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1948). See Jackson II, supra note 15, at 398; Jackson, Louis &
Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing InternationalEconomic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REV. 267, 334-45 & n.180 (1982) [hereinafter Jackson, Louis &
Matsushita]; Jackson, The GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic
Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249, 268, 281-92 (1967). The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) was accepted under authority granted the President by the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-66 (1982).
17. See Comment, United States CountervailingDuty Law, Renewed, Revamped and Revisited-Trade Act of 1974, 17 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 832, 841-42 (1976).
18. Id.
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those petitions.' 9 Moreover, it was the Treasury's position in 1964
that a domestic subsidy would not be countervailed absent an export20
stimulating effect.
The Trade Act of 197421 dramatically altered this situation.

That Act imposed specific time limits on administrative determinations 22 and, for the first time, made judicial review available to domestic manufacturers. 23 In light of these new statutory provisions, the
Treasury no longer had unfettered discretion to sidestep and delay

knotty and politically sensitive countervailing duty decisions. Nevertheless, even after passage of the Trade Act of 1974, the Treasury still
held fast to its export promotion theory in the case of domestic
24
subsidies.
The countervailing duty law was again substantially overhauled
in 1979 with passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.25 That
Act reaffirmed the principle that the amount of the countervailing
duty is to equal the amount of the benefit to the recipient of the sub-

sidy, 26 rather than equal to the cost to the government of furnishing
the subsidy.2 7 While the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 does not provide a bright line definition of the term "subsidy," it does set out illustrative lists of what constitutes export and domestic subsidies.28
19. Before 1967 the Treasury was not required to give public notice of an investigation.
See, e.g., 32 Fed. Reg. 13,276 (1967). Prior to 1974, only affirmative determinations were
required to be published. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 183-85 (1974); Jackson, Louis
& Matsushita, supra note 16, at 355-58.
20. See Memorandum to file from Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Hendricks
(May 28, 1964), quoted in ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. at 1218. See also 38
Fed. Reg. 1018, T.D. 73-10, 7 Treas. Dec. 24 (1973).
21. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975)(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1982)).
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (a), (d), (e) (Supp. V 1982).
23. Id. Compare United States v. Hammond Lead Products, 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
24. See, e.g., Float Glass Cases, 40 Fed. Reg. 27,499 (1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 1300 (1976); 41
Fed. Reg. 1299 (1976); 42 Fed. Reg. 13,016 (1976). These decisions eventually reached the
Customs Court (the predecessor court to the Court of International Trade) where, in two
instances, the Treasury's determinations were upheld by the Customs Court. See ASG Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1187 (Cust. Ct.) rev'd, 610 F.2d 770 (C.C.P.A. 1979), and
ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1195 (Cust. Ct.), rev'd, 610 F.2d 785
(C.C.P.A. 1979). In the third instance, however, the Treasury's determination was reversed.
ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200 (Cust. Ct. 1979).
25. Supra note 1.
26. See H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1979); S. REP. No. 249, 1st Sess.
84-85 (1979) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 249].
27. See Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,316, 39,328 (1982).
28. Section 771(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982). That section provides the following definition of "subsidy":
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These illustrative lists may be expanded administratively, "consistent
30
29
with the basic definition" of a subsidy.

In the context of domestic subsidies under the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, issues of whether government equity infusions are
countervailable have arisen; 3' whether certain government loans and

loan guarantees are countervailable; 32 and whether certain forms of
government procurement constitute an illegal subsidy. 33 This article's
special focus is whether domestic subsidies must be industry specific
before they may be countervailed, an issue which the Court of Inter-

national Trade has considered on four occasions under the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979.
III.

SUBSIDY SPECIFICITY

Section 771(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the
The term "subsidy" has the same meaning as the term "bounty or grant" as that
term is used in section 1303 of this title, and includes, but is not limited to, the
following:
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the Agreement (relating to illustrative list of export subsidies).
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by government action
to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries, whether
publicly or privately owned, and whether paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on
the manufacture, production, or export of any class or kind of merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with
commercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sustained by a
specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production, or
distribution.
The reference to "Annex A to the Agreement" is to the Agreement on the Interpretation and
Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
GATT, Basic Instruments 56 (26th Supp. 1980), commonly known as the "Subsidies Code."
The detailed illustrative list at the Annex to the Subsidies Code identifies as prohibited export
subsidies the provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm contingent upon export
performance, and currency retention schemes which involve a bonus on exports. Id.
29. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 26, at 84-85.
30. The responsibility for administering the countervailing duty law was transferred from
the Treasury Department to the Commerce Department effective January 2, 1980, by Executive Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980), and Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44
Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979).
31. See Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,316, 39,318-19
(1982); Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,300, 26,308 (1982); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5)(B)(i) (1982).
32. See Certain Steel Products from Italy, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,356, 39,358 (1982); Carbon
Steel Plate from Brazil, 48 Fed. Reg. 2,568, 2,576 (1983); Certain Steel Products from
Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,305 (1982).
33. See Industrial Nitrocellulose from France, 48 Fed. Reg. 11,971, 11,972 (1983).
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Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 34 broadly defines a subsidy as one
"provided or required by government action to a specific enterprise or
industry, or group of enterprises or industries. ' 35 This language indicates that any domestic subsidy must be industry specific in order for
it to come within the prohibitions of the CVD law. The introductory
paragraph of section 771(5) provides, however, that the term "subsidy" "includes, but is not limited to" the list of export and domestic
subsidies contained in the succeeding two subsections of section
771(5). The question which the Court of International Trade has
wrestled with is whether subsidy specificity is a necessary precondition in finding the existence of an unlawful subsidy or may certain
generally available domestic subsidies nevertheless be countervailed.
The administrative practice of the Treasury Department prior to
enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was to find government programs made "universally available to qualified firms" '36 as
not countervailable. 37 This practice has continued under the Commerce Department's administration of the CVD law. 38 Commerce
has adopted a two-step inquiry in analyzing whether a given government program is industry specific and, therefore, countervailable.
First, the law creating the program and any implementing regulations
are examined to determine if they expressly restrict benefits to a specific industry or group of industries. 39 If this determination is affirmative, the benefits are countervailed as an unlawful subsidy. If this
determination is negative, however, Commerce then examines
whether the benefits of the program are defacto limited. 4° If they are,
41
the program is deemed a countervailable subsidy.
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982).
35. Id. This language mirrors the proscription contained in Article 11:3 of the Subsidies
Code against "subsidies granted with the aim of giving an advantage to certain enterprises."
See supra note 28.
36. Certain Textiles and Textile Products from Pakistan, 44 Fed. Reg. 2,746, 40,884
(1979). See also Certain Textiles and Textile Products from Singapore, 44 Fed. Reg. 2,748,
35,334 (1979); Certain Textiles and Textile Products from Malaysia, 44 Fed. Reg. 41,001
(1979). For a critique of these determinations, see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590
F. Supp. 1237, 1244-45 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Anhydrous and Aqua Ammonia from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,522, 28,52324 (1983); Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 24,171-72 (1983);
Certain Steel Products from France, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,332, 39,338 (1982).
39. See, e.g., Certain Steel Products from the Netherlands, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,372, 39,37374 (1982); Certain Steel Products from the Federal Republic of Germany, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,345,
39,349 (1982).
40. See supra note 39.
41. Compare Certain Steel Products from the Netherlands, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,372, 39,373-
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The Court of International Trade (CIT) has reached divergent
conclusions regarding the specificity question. In a case of first impression, Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States,42 the CIT considered whether two accelerated depreciation tax programs in the
Republic of Korea were countervailable. 43 The CIT concluded that
because the accelerated depreciation tax benefits were available to all
manufacturers and producers within Korea, 44 those benefits were not
countervailable. 45 The court reached this conclusion based in part on
its definition of "subsidy" as a "special advantage" "conferred upon a
class of persons."'46 The court found additional support for its conclusion by noting that if Carlisle's contention was taken to its logical
extreme, public highways and bridges would be included as types of
countervailable benefits. 47 In the CIT's view, "[t]o suggest, as Carlisle
implicitly does here, that almost every import entering the stream of
'4 8
American commerce be countervailed simply defies reason.
74 (1982) (Dutch program on its face available to all industries, de facto beneficial to steel
industry), and Certain Steel Products from France, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,332 (1982) (information
flowing from research not made publicly available), with Certain Steel Products from the Federal Republic of Germany, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,345, 39,349 (1982) (research and development
program generally available de facto and de jure), and Fresh Cut Roses from Israel, 45 Fed.
Reg. 58,516, 58,519 (1980) (research information publicly available, even to competing American industry).
42. 564 F. Supp. 834, 837 & n.5 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
43. Id. at 835-36. Because the administrative determination was governed by the CVD
law in effect prior to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the applicable statute was section 303
of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976). Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co.,
564 F. Supp. at 835 n. 1. However, since Congress has given the term "bounty or grant" used
in section 303 the same meaning as the term "subsidy" found in the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982), the CIT's decision in Carlisle, although an "old law" case,
nevertheless has great bearing on section 771(5) "new law" cases. See Carlisle Tire & Rubber
Co., 564 F. Supp. at 839; Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985). See also S. Rep. No. 249, supra note 26, at 84 ("The definition of 'subsidy' is intended
to clarify that the term has the same meaning which administrative practice and the courts
have ascribed to the term 'bounty or grant' under section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930..
44. 564 F. Supp. at 836-37.
45. Id. at 837-39.
46. Id. at 838 (quoting Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 7 Ct. Cust. App. 97, 107 (1916),
aff'd, 249 U.S. 34 (1919), and Downs v. United States, 113 F. 114, 147 (4th Cir. 1902), aff'd,
187 U.S. 496 (1903)).
47. Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co., 564 F. Supp. at 838. The CIT also noted the practical
difficulty of quantifying such benefits:
[H]ow could the benefit to industry in general accruing from construction of a public
highway be fairly calculated? What would be the dollar value to the private sector of
governmental research and development programs? Not only would accurate calculation of such benefits be difficult in the extreme, doing so in a reasoned and evenhanded manner would be next to impossible.

48.

Id.
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The next case after Carlisle to consider the subsidy specificity
question was Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States.49 There, the
question presented was whether an income tax deduction allowed by
the South African government for the expenses of employee training
programs was a countervailable subsidy.5 0 South African companies
were allowed to deduct 200 percent of the expenses of the training
program from their taxable income. 5 1 The Commerce Department
found that this tax deduction was not a countervailable subsidy because it was a generally available tax benefit.52 The CIT affirmed the
agency's determination, but on the narrow ground that "the practice
in question was a tax law, and tax laws are not subsidies to the tax'53
payer if their terms are generally available.
In Bethlehem Steel, the CIT expressly rejected any broad exception for government practices or benefits which are generally available, 54 concluding that any such exception would be "contrary to the
fundamental purpose of the law."' 55 Tax laws are not subsidies, the
court stated, unless they are selective by their terms or in their application. 56 In a departure from its earlier statements in the Carlisle decision, 57 the CIT took issue with the argument that in order to be a
countervailable domestic subsidy the benefit must be to some discrete
58
portion of the production or manufacturing sector of the economy.
As the court understood the Commerce Department's argument, in
order to be a subsidy, "the government action must select a single
enterprise or industry, or a specific group of enterprises or industries
from out of the larger mass of enterprises or industries that make up
the entire productive sector."' 59 The CIT found this position untena49. 590 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
50. Id. at 1238-39.
51. Id. at 1239.
52. Id.; 47 Fed. Reg. 39,379, 39,381-82 (1982).
53. 590 F. Supp. at 1239.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1241.
57. Id. Although the court stated that its decision in Bethlehem Steel was in harmony
with its Carlisleopinion, the court heavily criticized the Carlisleopinion for purportedly being
too sweeping and general. Bethlehem Steel, 590 F. Supp. at 1246.
58. There has been some speculation that the unstated reason for the CIT's outright rejection of the so-called "general availability" test in Bethlehem Steel was that one of the pending issues in that case was whether the system of apartheid in South Africa constituted a
countervailable subsidy. By rejecting the subsidy specificity test, the possibility of finding
apartheid to be a subsidy was left open.
59. Id. The Commerce Department's argument was based on the language of section
771(5)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19
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ble. First, the court found that the text of that statute indicated "an
overwhelming comprehensiveness in the scope of the coverage. This
context alone dissolves the plausibility of... a momentous exception
for 'generally available' benefits."' 60 Second, the CIT stated that Congress intended to cover the entire spectrum of subsidization possibilities, "up to and including the entire productive sector."'6' The court
could find no logical basis for concluding that a particular benefit
could not be extended without limitation to all sectors of the economy. 6 2 Third, the CIT found no convincing past administrative prac63
tice evidencing a "generally available" exception to the CVD law.
Nothwithstanding its dissatisfaction with and disapproval of the
"generally available" principle, the court nevertheless concluded that
tax laws conferred no countervailable subsidy or benefit absent some
selectivity in the reduction or elimination of the tax. 64 In essence, the
CIT found tax laws to be sui generis because they represented decisions to impose certain economically adverse effects or to reduce or
eliminate those adverse effects. 65 Tax laws, in the court's view, are
distinguishable from other types of government action which are donative in nature, 66 the latter being positive bestowals of government
67
largesse, as opposed to tax laws which are adverse in their effect.
Accordingly, the CIT carved out what it termed a "limited" exception within the CVD law for tax laws, affirming the Commerce De68
partment's determination on that narrow basis.
The next occasion in which the CIT was presented with the subsidy specificity question was Agrexco v. United States.69 At issue there
was a research and development program provided by the government of Israel to its commercial rose growers. 70 The Commerce Department found no subsidy because the results of the research and
development program were available to the general public, including
U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B), which refers to prohibited domestic subsidies as those provided "to a
Id. at 1241.
specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries ....
60. Id. at 1241-42. The court also noted that the words "generally available" were nowhere to be found in the law. Id. at 1242.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1244-45.
64. Id. at 1245.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1246.
68. Id. at 1245-46.
69. 604 F. Supp. 1238, 1241 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
70. Id. at 1241.
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the American commercial rose growers. 7' The CIT rejected this conclusion, stating that the question was not whether the information
was generally available, but rather "whether the research and development is targeted to assist a particular, rather than a general industry."' 72 Since the program was targeted to the production of roses, it
was a subsidy, in the CIT's view. 73 This portion of the case was accordingly remanded to the Commerce Department for a determina74
tion of the value of the subsidy.
The most recent treatment by the CIT of the subsidy specificity
question is in Cabot Corp. v. United States.75 The issue presented in
that case was "whether benefits that are available on a nonpreferential
basis . . . [are] countervailable. ' '7 6 The court found unacceptable a
generally available test dependent upon the nominal availability of
benefits. 77 The court instead focused on whether a benefit was actually conferred upon a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries,7 8 thus adopting a de facto general availability
standard.7 9 If a particular program in fact bestows a competitive advantage or benefit on a specific class of producers to the exclusion of
others, that program would be seen as countervailable. 80 The CIT in
Cabot Corp. thus struck a middle ground, not rejecting outright the
subsidy specificity standard, but conditioning such specificity with a
requirement of de facto, as opposed to nominal, availability to a specific industry or group of industries.
These four decisions appear to be diametrically opposed. At one
extreme is the CIT's Carlisle decision informing foreign governments
that their development programs are not countervailable so long as
those programs are generally available to the production and manufacturing sectors of the economy. 8' In the middle of the spectrum is
the Cabot Corp. decision informing a foreign government that a pro71. Id.
72. Id. at 1241-42.
73. Id. at 1242.
74. Id.
75. 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
76. Id. at 730-31. Under the government program in issue, the Mexican government had
set prices for carbon black feedstock and natural gas which were purchased by carbon black
producers at prices below world market levels.
77. Id. at 730.
78. Id. at 732.
79. Id. at 730-32.
80. Id. at 732.
81. 564 F. Supp. at 837-39.
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gram is not a subsidy provided it is de facto generally available to the
production and manufacturing sectors of the economy.8 2 At the far
end of the spectrum is the CIT's decision in Bethlehem Steel, stating
in dictum that general availability is simply not a relevant consideration8 3 and will not place a government 84program beyond the reach of
the U.S. CVD law on that basis alone.
While the uncertainty created by this judicial patchwork is
troubling, it is not surprising considering the inability of the GATT
negotiating parties at the Tokyo Round to draft a well-defined domestic subsidies provision.85 At bottom, under any of these decisions, the
determination of countervailability involves the mechanical application of a specificity/availability test. None of these decisions consider,
explicitly at least, the trade distortive effects of a government program
alleged to be an illegal domestic subsidy.
It has been proposed elsewhere 86 that domestic subsidies be allowed so long as they are not trade distorting on a world level. 87 Certain subsidies may create a misallocation of market resources which
would otherwise not occur. 88 Subsidies which tamper with market
forces are considered anathema to a world system of free trade and
should be eliminated. 89 Those that do not should be tolerated. This
liberal attitude--one reflected in the Subsidies Code 9 0-also high82. 620 F. Supp. at 732.
83. 590 F. Supp. at 1240-41.
84. Id. at 1241.
85. Article 11 of the Subsidies Code begins with a recognition that "subsidies other than
export subsidies are widely used as important instruments for the promotion of social and
economic policy objectives and [the signatories] do not intend to restrict the right of signatories to achieve these and other important policy objectives .... " Subsidies Code, supra note
28, art. 11, para. 1. After listing some illustrations of prohibited domestic subsidies, such as
government financing, Article 11 goes on to note that "the enumeration of forms of subsidies
[They] should be reviewed periodically and that
is illustrative and non-exhaustive ....
...
this should be done, through consultations, in conformity with the spirit of Article XVI:5 of
the General Agreement." Subsidies Code, supra note 28, art. 11, para. 3. Article 11 closes by
providing that "nothing in paragraphs 1-3 [of Article 11] above and in particular the enumeration of forms of subsidies creates, in itself, any basis for action under the General Agreement
. "1 Subsidies Code, supra note 28, art. 11, para. 4. Thus, the Subsidies Code fails to
.
adequately define prohibited domestic subsidies and, more importantly, makes even the few
illustrations essentially non-binding.
86. Barcelo, Subsidies and CountervailingDuties-Analysis and a Proposal,9 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 779, 785-86, 835-42 (1977) [hereinafter Barcelo II]; Schwartz & Harper, The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REV. 831 (1972).
87. Barcelo II, supra note 86, at 838-41; -Schwartz & Harper, supra note 86, 833-34.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See supra note 85.
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lights the politically sensitive nature of assessing countervailing duties
against the programs of another sovereign nation, a practice which is
an open invitation for retaliation. 9 1 This outlook further recognizes
the practical difficulty, as well as the administrative morass, 92 of calculating the benefits accruing from domestic programs to imports.
Under those circumstances virtually every import entering the United
States would be subject to countervailing duties.
In the Carlisle decision the Court of International Trade recognized the impossibility and absurdity of administering an overly broad
countervailing duty law, 93 and for that reason adopted a subsidy specificity standard as the test for determining whether a government program should be countervailed. 94 However, the court's focus should
not be only on whether a domestic subsidy is simply specific or general in nature, but also on whether a subsidy causes a distortion 95 in
the allocation of market resources and, thus, a distortion in the pattern of world trade. The following reasons have been given for why
distortion ought to be the primary focus, with specificity being a
threshold consideration:
Subsidies granted to individual firms, such as those ailing financially, to particular industries, such as aircraft production or shipbuilding, and even to new investment in depressed geographical
regions have a more particularized effect on the output of given
products. They are likely to have more pronounced effects on
trade flows, as well. Should such subsidies be prohibited and countries free to countervail or take other retaliatory action against
them?
Arguments for such a general rule face two serious difficulties.
First, in a given case such government interventions in the domes91. See G. Horlick, Current Issues in Countervailing Duty Law 36, reprinted in THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS AcT OF 1979-FoUR YEARS LATER (Practicing Law Institute 1983)
("The better rationale for the specificity requirement is the practical one. With a nondiscretionary countervailing duty law, such as that of the U.S., there could be an enormous proliferation of countervailing duty cases as the U.S. and its trading partners battle it out to calculate
duties against the benefits of each other's roads, education, tax systems, and so on.").
92. See Barcelo II, supra note 86, at 836 ("These [domestic] subsidies have such a widespread effect on production that countervailing duties, were they allowed in such cases, could
be imposed on almost every product which enters international commerce. Moreover, measurement of the exact extent of the net subsidy falling on any given product line would be
unusually difficult. In any given case the amount of offsetting duty levied could be quite arbitrary.") (footnote omitted).
93. Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co., 564 F. Supp. at 838-39.
94. Id.
95. For a definition of the term "distort" as used in the context of international trade, see
Barcelo II, supra note 86, at 838 n.248.
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tic market, in contrast generally to export subsidies, may be either
efficiency enhancing or distorting. A general prohibition cannot be
based on the certainty that such [selective] subsidies are always
inefficient. Second, even if a given subsidy is clearly inefficient, because it distorts production of ordinary goods and services from
the Pareto optimum, governments may pursue such a policy for
internal political or socioeconomic objectives .... This means that
a general rule for all selective domestic subsidies cannot be established. Each subsidy must be analyzed individually for its effi96
ciency effects.
Thus, not only do compelling political and practical considerations exist for examining whether a domestic subsidy is specific or
general in nature, but strong economic factors likewise exist for examining the trade distorting character of such subsidies.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the courts have rejected
any trade distortion test, 97 finding it either too vague a concept 9 8 or at
odds with congressional intent. 99 While plausible arguments may
have existed prior to 1979 for rejecting a trade distortion analysisparticularly arguments based on legislative history 10-there is some
question whether those arguments are as sound today. The legislative
history of the Trade Act of 1974101 is replete with references to the
trade distorting nature of subsidies.102 Arguably, it was Congress' in96. Barcelo II, supra note 86, at 838-39 (footnotes omitted). Barcelo recommends that a
permanent GATT panel be established to review domestic production subsidies for their efficiency effects. Id. at 839. Schwartz and Harper have noted that "the issue is not that of
identifying and remedying 'distortions' but rather of determining if a particular measure on
balance 'corrects' or 'distorts' the market process, that is, whether it increases or decreases the
efficiency with which resources are allocated." Schwartz & Harper, supra note 86, at 834.
97. See, e.g., ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 610 F.2d at 776 ("To permit the Secretary to avoid using his waiver authority ... by simply finding that ... there is no bounty or
grant through employment of a vague and 'undefined' . . . international trade distortion test
would effectively frustrate the Congressional intent to tighten administration of the countervailing duty law"); ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. at 1216-17 (the argument
"that the countervailing duty law was intended to reach only those bounties or grants which
distort trade, i.e., promote exports ...
is without merit").
98. ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 610 F.2d at 776.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
102. See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7224 ("Nontariff barriers to and distortions of, trade cover a variety
of devices which distort trade, including ...
subsidies... "). In that same Senate report, it
was further observed that "the interests of the United States will be best served by international agreement permanently eliminating the use of governmental subsidies which distort
trade patterns." Id. at 186, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7321.
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tent in 1974 that until such time as an international agreement was
reached regulating domestic subsidies, the CVD law would not incorporate an "adverse effects" standard. 10 3 Today, however, with the
Subsidies Code in place, the argument against applying some form of
trade distortion test has been substantially weakened. Indeed, a fair
reading of the legislative history of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
indicates that it is Congress' intent to make a trade distortion test an
integral part of the CVD law.1°4
Even though the Court of International Trade has not expressly
applied any form of trade distortion test in its most recent CVD opinions, a rough form of trade distortion test still exists if not in name at
least in practice through the guise of the subsidy specificity standard.
If domestic subsidies are provided generally to the manufacturing or
production sector of an economy, "[tiheir effect, by definition, is not
to encourage the production of any one product ... over alternative
output lines .... "1 0 5 Conversely, selective domestic subsidies "have a
more particularized effect on the output of given products. They are
likely to have more pronounced effects on trade flows, as well."' 10 6
While all domestic subsidies should be analyzed individually for
their efficiency effects, 10 7 even if no trade distortion analysis per se is
utilized by the courts, the subsidy specificity standard closely approximates such an analysis. Yet the CIT in Bethlehem Steel 0 rejected
any such test, stating that "[t]he simple and direct way to understand
the definition of subsidy . . .is to see it as an attempt to cover all
possibilities and all situations which fall within the meaning of the
term ....,"109 This statement is tautological, however, saying nothing
more than that everything that is a subsidy should be defined as a
103. See ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. at 1222.
104. The Senate report to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 stated in this connection:
This title [implementing the Subsidies Code] substantially revises longstanding U.S.
laws pertaining to countervailing duties .... Subsidies and dumping are two of the
most pernicious practices which distort international trade to the disadvantage of
United States commerce ....
By way of general introduction, the committee emphasizes the potentially important
international rules on the use of subsidies incorporated in the agreement relating to
subsidies and countervailing measures .... [T]he agreement acknowledges the potential trade-distortive effects of domestic subsidies ....
S. REP. No. 249, supra note 26, at 37-38.
105. Barcelo II, supra note 86, at 836.
106. Id. at 837.
107. Id. at 838.
108. 590 F. Supp. at 1241-42.
109. Id. at 1242.
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subsidy. How then is that decision to be reconciled with the congressional desire that only trade distorting domestic subsidies be countervailed 0 and with the Carlisle, Agrexco, and Cabot Corp. opinions?
Although the court in Cabot Corp. purported to cut the Gordian knot
with its de facto specificity test, 1 "I the court actually did little more
than add gloss to what was previously stated in the Carlisle opinionthat there must be some element of subsidy specificity in order for a
purported domestic subsidy to be countervailable.
This de facto selectivity analysis by definition encompasses a
trade distortion test. 2 Under Bethlehem Steel, however, given the
court's rejection of any general availability/specificity standard, subsidies which are not selective, and thus do not cause an inefficient allocation of resources, nevertheless risk being countervailed. The court
was clearly unconcerned with the potential trade distorting nature of
a given program, seemingly more preoccupied with its view of what
Congress intended. In this regard it noted that "[t]he question is not
what is normal in the economy under investigation, but rather what is
reconcilable with the standards of commercial fairness envisioned by
' 3
this countervailing duty law." "1
In the final analysis what seems to be the difference among the
CIT's most recent pronouncements on what constitutes a countervailable domestic subsidy is the trade distorting character of those subsidies. The Carlisleand Cabot Corp. decisions show an implicit concern
for distortions within a nation's economy created by sector-specific
subsidies. By focusing on the selectivity of a domestic subsidy, these
opinions necessarily adopt a standard which takes into account market resource misallocations attributable to specific domestic subsidies.
Bethlehem Steel, by sharp contrast, brings within its sweep of prohibited subsidies every type of domestic subsidy, without regard to the
distorting effect of the subsidy and without regard to the practical
administrative or politically sensitive considerations which come into
play under such a sweeping standard.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Until the Court of International Trade frankly acknowledges
110. See supra note 104; Barcelo II, supra note 86, at 836. See supra notes 103-106 and
accompanying text.
11.
620 F. Supp. at 731-32.
112. See supra note 105.
113. Bethlehem Steel, 590 F. Supp. at 1242.
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that the reach of the countervailing duty law goes no further than to
ban selective domestic subsidies which are trade distorting, the
caselaw in this field will remain patchwork and hopelessly irreconcilable. Although it can be argued that the earlier ASG Industries decisions 1 4 prevent consideration of the trade distorting effects of
domestic subsidies, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 has in effect
reversed those decisions in this connection. Nevertheless, the CIT's
decisions in Carlisleand Cabot Corp. have finessed the ASG Industries
opinions. Without stating in so many words that the trade effects of
domestic subsidies are to be considered in evaluating whether they are
countervailable, the court effectively achieves this result. The Bethlehem Steel decision stands in stark contrast not only to the other two
precedents of the CIT on the subsidy specificity question, but also in
comparison to the legislative history of the countervailing duty law
since 1974. In the interests of judicial harmony, sound economics,
and international comity, the Bethlehem Steel decision should be
overrruled.
114.

See supra note 97.

